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Dividend Policy Inside the 
Multinational Firm 
Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley, and James R. Hines Jr.* 
This paper examines the determinants ofprofit repatriation policies for US multinational firms. 
Dividend repatriations are surprisingly persistent and resemble dividend payments to external 
shareholders. Tax considerations influence dividendrepatriations, but not decisively, as differentially- 
taxed entitiesfeature similarpolicies and some firms incur avoidable tax penalties. Parent companies 
requiring cash to fund domestic investments, or to pay dividends to common shareholders, draw on 
the resources of their foreign affiliates through repatriations. Incompletely controlled affiliates are 
more likely than others to make regular dividend payments and to trigger avoidable tax costs 
through repatriations. The results indicate that traditional corporate finance concerns - taxation, 
costly external finance, and agency problems - are also critical to the internal capital markets of 
multinational firms. 
The choice of whether to repatriate earnings from a foreign subsidiary is one of the most important 
decisions in multinational financial management. This paper identifies the factors that shape 
repatriation policy, thereby illuminating the functioning ofthe internal capital markets ofmultinational 
firms. 
Dividend repatriations represent sizable financial flows. In 1999, a year in which US corporations 
listed in Compustat had after-tax earnings of $516 billion and paid $198 billion in dividends to 
common shareholders (Grullon and Michaely, 2002), the foreign affiliates of US multinational firms 
had after-tax earnings of $182 billion and repatriated $97 billion to the United States as dividends. 
Dividend repatriations are so large that part of the motivation for the partial repatriation tax holiday 
in 2005 was that the resulting inflow of funds from abroad might be large enough to have positive 
macroeconomic consequences for the US economy. 
Surprisingly, relatively little is understood about the characteristics and determinants of the 
policies governing these payments. This paper analyzes the repatriation behavior of virtually all US 
multinational parent firms and their subsidiaries from 1982 to 2002. The paper identifies three factors 
that shape dividend policy within the multinational firm: 1) the taxation of dividend income, 2) 
domestic financing and investment needs, and 3) agency problems inside firms. 
The statistical analysis offirm-level data on US multinational companies was conducted at the International Investment 
Division, Bureau ofEconomicAnalysis, USDepartment of Commerce under arrangements that maintain legal confidentiality 
requirements. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect official positions of the US Department of 
Commerce. The authors thank various seminar participants, two anonymous referees andBill Christie (the editor)for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft and the Division of Research at Harvard Business School for financial support. 
* Mihir A. Desai is the Rock Center Associate Professor at the Harvard Business School and Faculty Research Fellow at the 
National Bureau of Economic Research. C. Fritz Foley is an Assistant Professor ofFinance at the Harvard Business School 
and Faculty Research Fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research. James R. Hines Jr is Richard A. Musgrave 
Collegiate Professor of Economics at the University of Michigan and Research Associate at the National Bureau ofEconomic 
Research. 
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The flows of capital analyzed in this paper consist of payments to multinational parent firms 
declared out of the income of foreign subsidiaries. These flows do not include the repatriation of 
invested equity. As described below, tax considerations alone would suggest that dividend policies 
inside the firm would be irregular and lumpy. But in contrast to these predictions, dividend 
repatriations are quite regular and can be characterized by a process of partial adjustment hat was 
first described by Lintner (1956). Multinational firms behave as though they select target payouts 
for their foreign affiliates, gradually adjusting payouts over time in response to changes in earnings. 
Current dividends by affiliates rise by roughly $0.40 with every additional dollar of their after-tax 
profits. This pattern of persistent payouts does not appear to be an artifact of other regular investment 
or financing decisions at the affiliate level. 
Comparing the behavior of foreign affiliates whose dividend repatriations are subject to high 
rates of tax with the behavior of affiliates whose dividends are not subject to tax illuminates the 
relevance of tax factors. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2001) show that firms pursue dividend payout 
policies designed in part to reduce tax obligations. However, further analysis shows that tax 
minimization cannot explain a significant portion of the dividend policies observed inside firms. 
Sharply distinctive tax treatments across organizational forms are associated with only modest 
differences in dividend policies. Some firms even appear to engage in a variety of tax-penalized 
behavior that involves the simultaneous repatriation of a dividend and investment of new equity in 
the same subsidiary. 
Costly external finance may lead parent companies to seek cash dividends from their foreign 
affiliates to satisfy domestic financing and investment needs. For example, corporations that pay 
dividends to common shareholders could fund these payments by triggering repatriations. 
Comparing the dividend behavior of affiliates of publicly and privately held parent firms and 
introducing controls for parental dividend payouts indicates that a portion of external dividend 
payments are funded with repatriations from foreign affiliates. Surprisingly, only a small difference 
exists between the dividend repatriation policies of firms facing public capital market pressures to 
pay dividends to common shareholders and those that do not face such pressures. 
Financially constrained parents with profitable domestic investment opportunities might 
finance capital expenditures by drawing on the accumulated earnings of foreign affiliates. This 
possibility is tested by measuring the extent to which the dividend policies of heavily leveraged 
firms in industries with high values of Tobin's q differ from the dividend policies of other 
firms. The evidence indicates that firms with significant domestic cash needs arising from 
a combination of attractive domestic investment opportunities and high degrees of leverage 
repatriate cash from foreign affiliates to meet these needs. 
Internal agency problems, or the inability to fully monitor foreign managers, can also bring 
about distinctive repatriation policies. Regular dividend payments restrict the financial discretion 
of foreign managers, thereby reducing associated agency problems. Conflicts of interest can arise 
when ownership is divided, since local owners may influence managers to undertake transactions 
at other than market prices. The empirical results discussed in this paper indicate that explicitly 
tax-penalized behavior is most common when affiliates are partially owned. This finding suggests 
that at least some of the regularity in dividend repatriations may be driven by control considerations 
inside the firm. 
Taken as a whole, the results demonstrate that traditional corporate finance concerns - taxation, 
costly external finance, and agency problems - which are typically emphasized with respect 
to arms-length financing decisions, also influence the internal capital markets of multinational 
firms. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section I of the paper summarizes tax and non-tax motivations 
for repatriation policies. Section II describes the data and provides some descriptive statistics. 
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Section III presents analysis of the repatriation policies of foreign affiliates of American firms, and 
Section IV concludes. 
I. Motivations for Repatriation Policies 
Many previous studies of dividend repatriations analyze the effects of taxes. Dividend 
repatriations from foreign affiliates to American parent companies are voluntary distributions 
with tax consequences that are functions of their magnitude and timing. American corporations 
owe taxes to the United States on their foreign incomes but are entitled to defer US tax liabilities 
on the unrepatriated portions of the profits of incorporated foreign affiliates. The United States 
also permits firms to claim credits against US taxes for any foreign income taxes paid on income 
remitted as dividends. Dividend repatriations from foreign subsidiaries to their American parents 
thus generate US tax liabilities that are functions of differences between foreign tax rates and the 
US corporate tax rate. 
Generally speaking, firms owe US taxes based on the difference between the applicable 
foreign tax rate and the US rate. If the US tax rate exceeds the foreign tax rate, then the effective 
repatriation tax equals the difference between the two. But if the foreign tax rate exceeds the 
US tax rate, then dividends do not trigger additional US tax liability and taxpayers can apply 
any difference against US tax liabilities on other foreign income. A notable exception to this 
treatment is that the dividend flows from unincorporated foreign branch affiliates and incor- 
porated foreign affiliates that are indirectly owned through certain other countries do not have 
US tax consequences. 
US taxes are due on foreign branch income as earned, regardless of whether the branch remits 
dividends to the parent company. If an affiliate is indirectly owned by a parent that uses a holding 
company located in a country that does not tax dividend repatriations, then the firm can generally 
relocate affiliate profits without incurring US tax costs. This distinction is important to the 
analysis of taxation and repatriation policies because it is possible to isolate the relative im- 
portance of tax factors by comparing the policies of incorporated and unincorporated foreign 
subsidiaries. 
The desire to avoid US tax liabilities is likely to influence dividend repatriations in relatively 
straightforward ways. Given that US tax liabilities are triggered by repatriation, these tax 
liabilities can be deferred by reinvesting earnings abroad rather than remitting dividends to parent 
companies. The incentive to defer repatriation is much stronger for affiliates in low-tax countries 
whose dividends trigger significant US tax obligations than they are for affiliates in high-tax 
countries, particularly since taxpayers receive net credits for repatriations from affiliates in 
countries with tax rates that exceed the US rate.' As a consequence of these incentives, dividend 
'Hartman (1985) applies the "tax capitalization" or "new view" logic to the multinational firm to suggest that repatriation 
taxes need not affect multinational dividend policy if current repatriation tax conditions are not expected to change. 
In practice, there is ample evidence (see Altshuler, Newlon and Randolph (1995)) that conditions do change over 
time, thereby making it attractive to repatriate dividends opportunistically. Since excess foreign tax credits cannot be 
carried forward and back in time without loss of present value, even firms in unchanging tax situations face incentives 
to combine dividend repatriations from affiliates in high-tax and low-tax locations. Such strategies are costly and not 
always available, as a result of which repatriation taxes discourage dividend repatriations from affiliates, particularly 
those in low-tax countries. Desai and Hines (2004) find that US firms incurred $20 billion of direct US tax liabilities on 
their foreign incomes in 1999, a figure that rises considerably when taking indirect costs into account, suggesting that 
taxpayers are unable to find cost-effective methods of avoiding all of their US tax liabilities on foreign income. 
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policies that maximize value are thought to be irregular and lumpy to facilitate the averaging of 
credits across countries with different tax rates.2 
Previous studies of dividend repatriations emphasize these tax factors. For example, Hines and 
Hubbard (1990) analyze a cross-section of US multinationals using IRS data from 1984, finding 
that tax considerations affect the timing of dividend repatriations. Other tax-focused studies of 
dividend policy inside the firm, such as Altshuler, Newlon, and Randolph (1995), use repeated 
cross-sections to distinguish effects associated with transitory and permanent changes in tax 
costs. Altshuler and Grubert (2003) and Desai, Foley and Hines (2003) note that firms can defer 
repatriation tax liabilities by investing foreign profits in other foreign affiliates rather than 
repatriating profits to domestic parent companies and provide evidence of the proliferation of 
organizational forms that facilitate such deferral. Finally, Desai, Foley and Hines (2001) calculate 
the efficiency costs of repatriation taxes using estimates of the responsiveness of repatriations to 
taxes in a panel setting. 
There are strong reasons to expect dividend repatriation policies to reflect considerations other 
than tax factors. Since dividend repatriations represent significant financial flows, repatriation 
policies may reflect the financing concerns of parent firms that draw on subsidiary cash flows to 
finance domestic expenses. Two examples of such domestic expenses are dividend payments to 
external shareholders and capital expenditures in home countries. Since external finance can be 
quite costly, particularly for firms that are already maintaining large amounts of external debt, 
dividend repatriations from foreign affiliates may offer an attractive source of finance for paying 
dividends to common shareholders and domestic investment expenditures, despite possible 
associated tax costs. 
The desire to control corporate managers around the world carries implications for dividend 
policies. A multinational firm's central management can use financial flows within the firm to 
evaluate the financial prospects and needs of far-flung foreign affiliates and to limit the discretion 
of foreign managers. In a 1998 speech to country managers, the CFO of Wyeth Pharmaceuticals 
identified several mechanisms of diversion by country managers, including using vendors to 
misappropriate corporate funds, employing unauthorized sales programs and trade promotions 
for personal benefit, and transacting with family-owned firms at the expense of the multinational 
firm.3 As this observation suggests, multinationals may find it sensible to mandate dividend 
payments to police and monitor foreign managers, limit their ability to misallocate funds, and to 
extract returns on investments, in much the same way as public shareholders use dividends to 
monitor and control their firms. 
II. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Annual Survey of US Direct Investment Abroad 
from 1982 through 2002 provides a panel of data on the financial and operating characteristics of 
2Some host countries, particularly some low-income countries in the earlier years of the sample, limit dividend repatriations 
through the use of capital controls. Desai, Foley and Hines (2006) find that dividend repatriations are responsive to tax 
incentives controlling for such policies. 
3The speech by the Wyeth CFO was made public as part of a lawsuit brought by the general manager of the firm's 
Swedish subsidiary, who alleged that he was demoted for revealing alleged improprieties related to the tax treatment of 
compensation of foreign managers. 
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the foreign and domestic activities of US multinational firms.4 The International Investment and 
Trade in Services Survey Act requires that all firms owning foreign affiliates with sales, assets, or 
net income greater than $7 million in 1999 file detailed financial and operating items for each 
affiliate and information on the value of transactions between US parents and their foreign 
affiliates. The availability of this information makes the BEA survey sample uniquely 
comprehensive. 
In the BEA survey, data on dividend payments made by affiliates reflect only those payments 
to stockholders declared out of current and prior period net income. Thus the data exclude other 
types of capital movement, such as the repatriation of funds associated with the sale of equity. 
Dividend payments from affiliates to their parent firms appear to be common, large, and 
persistent. 
Figure 1 plots the percentage of affiliates that report positive dividends and the median payout 
ratio among payers for two types of affiliates--majority owned incorporated affiliates and 
branches-over the entire sample period. Averaging across the annual rates indicates that 31% of 
majority-owned incorporated affiliates and 27% of branches pay dividends. The median ratio of 
dividends to net income for payers (again averaging annual ratios across years) is 71% for 
majority-owned incorporated affiliates and 88% for branches. Foreign subsidiaries and foreign 
branches are somewhat equally likely to remit dividends, and do so with similar payout ratios. 
Dividend payments exhibit strong intertemporal persistence. Averaging across years, 69% of 
affiliates that paid dividends in one year paid dividends again the following year. Figure 2 displays 
this rate for each year over the 1983-2002 period. This figure indicates that the rate of persistence 
remains high over the sample period. 
III. Empirical Design and Results 
The regression analysis detailed in this section exploits the panel nature of the data. Table I 
provides information on the means, medians, and standard deviations of variables used in the 
empirical work.5 
The Lintner dividend model, first developed to analyze dividend payments from corporations 
to various common shareholders, provides an analytic framework with which to identify the 
nature of repatriation policies. Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997), among others, conclude 
that "Lintner's model of dividends remains the best description of the dividend setting process 
available." Accordingly, this paper considers the extent to which the Lintner model characterizes 
the repatriation policies of multinational affiliates, paying particular attention to how foreign 
earnings translate into dividends. 
4Detailed information on the data collected in this survey appears in Appendix II of Desai, Foley and Hines (2002) and 
in Mataloni (1995). US direct investment abroad is defined as the direct or indirect ownership or control by a single US 
legal entity of at least 10% of the voting securities of an incorporated foreign business enterprise or the equivalent interest 
in an unincorporated foreign business enterprise. A US multinational entity is the combination of a single US legal entity 
that has made the direct investment, called the US parent, and at least one foreign business enterprise, called the foreign 
affiliate. The term affiliate refers to both subsidiaries, those affiliates incorporated abroad, and unincorporated branch 
affiliates. 
5Minority-owned foreign affiliates are not part of the panel, as dividend payments are not recorded for these affiliates. The 
sample is selected to omit affiliates with the highest 1% of net income and lowest 1% of net income each year in order 
to enhance the robustness of the results. Also, calculated country tax rates are constrained to lie between 0% and 100%, 
which entails adjustments to 226 affiliate-year observations. 
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Figure 1. Propensity o Pay Dividends for Majority-Owned I corporated Affiliates (MOIAs) and 
Branches, 1982-2002 
Diamonds and squares indicate fractions of entities that remit dividends for majority owned incorporated 
affiliates and branches, respectively. Triangles and X's depict the median ratios of dividends to net income 
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Figure 2. Persistence ofDividend Payments, 1983-2002 
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Table I. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the affiliate-level panel of annual data from 1982 to 2002 that are 
analyzed in Tables II-V. Measures of dividends, net income and capital expenditures are in thousands of 
nominal U.S. dollars. Branch Dummy is equal to one for affiliates that are organized as branches, and 
Indirect Ownership Dummy is equal to one for separately incorporated affiliates for which the parent holds 
an indirect ownership claim. Parent Dividends to Shareholders Interacted with Relative Assets is the 
interaction of parent dividends to common shareholders as reported in Compustat and the ratio of affiliate 
assets to consolidated firm assets as reported in Compustat. Panel B presents descriptive statistics of parent- 
level annual data used in the analysis presented in Table VI. Dividend payments by affiliates to parents and 
affiliate net income are aggregated across affiliates within parent systems. Panel C displays affiliate-level 
data that are studied in columns 1-3 of Table VII. The Percent ofAffiliate Dividend Payments is computed 
across all years an affiliate appears in the sample. Measures of country tax rates and the log of GDP per 
capita are averages of these variables for a particular affiliate across years in which the affiliate appears in 
the sample. The Partial Ownership Dummy is equal to one if the affiliate is ever partially owned. Panel D 
presents sample statistics for the subsample of the sample described in Panel C for which parents increase 
their paid-in capital in the affiliate. Results of analyzing these data appear in columns 4-6 of Table VII. 
Panel A. Affiliate-level Data for Tables II-V 
Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Dividend Payments by Affiliates to Parents 6,677 0 47,127 
Net Income 7,580 1,773 25,572 
Capital Expenditures 9,064 985 41,192 
Branch Dummy 0.0646 0.0000 0.2458 
Indirect Ownership Dummy 0.1594 0.0000 0.3661 
Parent Dividends to Shareholders 4,451 749 18,692 
Interacted with Relative Assets 
Panel B. Parent-level Data for Table VI 
Aggregate Dividend Payments 39,308 0 227,059 
by Affiliates to Parents 
Aggregate Net Income 58,534 4,964 297,093 
Parent Leverage 0.5699 0.5555 0.2600 
Panel C. Affiliate-level Data for Columns 1-3, Table VII 
Percent ofAffiliate Dividend Payments that 
are Positive 0.2880 0.2000 0.3054 
Country Tax Rate 0.3277 0.3436 0.1176 
Partial Ownership Dummy 0.1893 0.0000 0.3917 
Log of GDP Per Capita 9.4158 9.8016 0.9382 
Panel D. Affiliate-level Data for Columns 4-6, Table VII 
Dummy For Payment of Dividend by 
Affiliates when Paid-in Capital Increases 0.2821 0.0000 0.4501 
Country Tax Rate 0.3328 0.3415 0.1141 
Partial Ownership Dummy 0.1227 0.0000 0.3281 
Log of GDP Per Capita 9.4077 9.7986 0.9409 
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The first step in identifying the dividend policies of foreign affiliates is to estimate the 
parameters associated with the Lintner framework. The essential features of the Lintner model 
are that tax and nontax variables determine both the target payout ratios and the rates at which 
actual dividends adjust to desired dividends. Thus, it is possible to generalize the Lintner 
framework by estimating the parameters of payout functions that differ between affiliates, based 
on observable characteristics of affiliates and parent companies. Extension of the framework 
demonstrates the extent to which tax motivations, domestic financing and investment needs, and 
control problems influence target payout ratios and rates of adjustment.6 
A. Payout Policies of Foreign Affiliates 
Table II displays the results of estimating a Lintner dividend equation for all majority-owned 
affiliates, assuming all affiliates have identical dividend payout equations. Since the Lintner 
specification includes lagged dividends as an explanatory variable, the 102,380 affiliate-year 
observations exclude those affiliates that appear only once in the sample, and the initial 
observations of all affiliates, including all 1982 observations. 
The Lintner specification fits the data quite well.7 The estimated 0.2263 coefficient on lagged 
dividends in the regression reported in column 1 implies that affiliates pay dividends with 
adjustment parameters equal to (1 - 0.23), or 0.77. The affiliate's desired steady-state payout 
ratio is given by the ratio of the estimated coefficient on net income (0.37) and the estimated 
adjustment parameter. In the case of the estimates reported in column one, the implied desired 
steady-state payout ratio is (0.37/0.77), or 48%. 
This regression is repeated in columns 2 and 3, introducing fixed effects for parent firms and 
for affiliates, respectively, to control for unobservable characteristics that might influence 
dividend policy at the parent or affiliate level. Although the results with parent-firm fixed effects 
are not notably different from the results in column 1, including the affiliate fixed effects sharply 
reduces the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on lagged dividends, presumably by removing 
much of the variation in lagged dividends. Since the smaller magnitude is largely an artifact of 
the shortness of the panel, the subsequent analysis incorporates parent-firm, rather than affiliate, 
fixed effects. The Tobit specification of the basic Lintner regression equation presented in column 
4 provides qualitatively similar results. 
Dividend policy is one component of an overall financial policy that includes decisions about 
net borrowing, capital expenditures, and other sources and uses of funds. It is possible that foreign 
affiliates with attractive investment opportunities finance their new capital expenditures largely 
6Early cross-sectional studies, such as Fama and Babiak (1968), report systematic differences between firms in the 
parameters of the Lintner functions that characterize their dividend payouts. Dewenter and Warther (1998) interpret 
differences in adjustment parameters as evidence of the impact of Japanese financial policies in their comparison of 
keiretsu and non-keiretsu firms. Fama and French (2002) use Lintner-like specifications to test the implications of the 
pecking order theory of capital structure. Table VII of Desai, Foley, and Hines (2002) presents results from estimating 
separate firm-specific Lintner parameters for each multinational group in the BEA panel, reporting findings that match 
those obtained from regressions in which each firm is restricted to having the same parameters (which vary according to 
observable firm characteristics). 
7The basic Lintner specification in column (1) of Table 2 omits a constant term. In his original study of dividends, Lintner 
included a constant, but he examined the behavior of aggregate dividends, not dividends of individual firms. Subsequent 
research presents some evidence in favor of including a constant (see, for example, Choe (1990)) and some evidence in 
favor of suppressing it (see, for example, Fama and Babiak (1968)). The results presented here do not materially change 
if a constant is included. For an analysis of these data using a Lintner specification that includes a constant, see Desai, 
Foley, and Hines (2001). 
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Table II. Lintner Dividend Specifications for Affiliate Payments to Parent Firms 
The dependent variable in all specifications is the dollar value of dividend payments by majority-owned 
affiliates. Net Income is the after-foreign tax net income of the affiliate. Lagged Dividend Payments 
is the dollar value of dividend payments by the affiliate in the previous year. Column 1 presents an 
OLS specification without fixed effects. Column 2 presents an OLS specification with parent fixed 
effects. Column 3 presents an OLS specification with affiliate fixed effects. In columns 1 through 3, 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. Column 4 presents a Tobit specification 
with standard errors presented in parentheses. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Net Income 0.3694*** 0.3585*** 0.3019*** 0.2843*** 
(0.0177) (0.0183) (0.0201) (0.0186) 
Lagged Dividend Payments 0.2263*** 0.2139*** 0.1136*** 0.2267*** 
(0.0328) (0.0334) (0.0359) (0.0339) 
Fixed Effects? No Yes-Parent Yes-Affiliate No 
OLS or Tobit? OLS OLS OLS Tobit 
R- Squared 0.3358 0.3236 0.4378 
Log-Likelihood -435,969 
No. Obs 102,380 102,380 102,380 102,380 
Payout Ratio 0.48 0.46 0.34 0.37 
Adjustment Parameter 0.77 0.79 0.89 0.77 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
by reducing or omitting dividends to parent companies. If so, and if capital expenditures are 
correlated over time, then the estimated dividend equations displayed in Table II and elsewhere 
might reflect the impact of changing investment patterns. 
Table III presents the results of a number of regressions designed to explore this possibility. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table III show the estimated coefficients for equations that are identical to 
those in columns 1 and 2 of Table II, except that in Table III affiliate capital expenditure is added 
as an explanatory variable. Including this variable has very little impact on the estimated net 
income and lagged dividend coefficients, which are almost identical to the values reported in 
Table II. Furthermore, the estimated effects of affiliate capital expenditures are positive in the 
regressions reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table III. These effects are inconsistent with a simple 
model in which dividend repatriations represent funds not used for foreign capital expenditures. 
It is not necessary for foreign affiliates with attractive investment opportunities to reduce 
planned dividend payments to their American parent firms, since they can finance capital 
expenditures, as well as dividends, by net borrowing. Columns 3 through 6 of Table III report the 
results of the regressions where the sample of foreign affiliates is distinguished by the extent of 
local indebtedness. Affiliates with local debt/asset ratios that exceed median values for their 
industries are classified as having "high" local debt, while others are classified as having "low" 
local debt. Affiliates with high local debt/asset ratios may have the least ability to use capital 
markets to obtain additional financing for their activities, and therefore might exhibit the greatest 
impact of capital expenditures on dividends. 
The results reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table III indicate that affiliates with considerable 
debt have dividend payout ratios that are higher and more sensitive to income than are the payout 
ratios of affiliates with little debt. The 0.3167 and 0.0943 coefficients in column 4 imply that 
heavily indebted affiliates increase their dividend repatriations by $0.41 for every additional 
dollar of foreign income, whereas affiliates without heavy debt obligations increase their dividend 
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Table III. Dividend Payments, Capital Expenditures, and Local Debt 
The dependent variable in all specifications is the dollar value of dividend payments by majority-owned 
affiliates to parents. Net Income is the after-foreign tax net income of the affiliate. Lagged Dividend 
Payments is the dollar value of dividend payments by the affiliate in the previous year. Capital 
Expenditures i  the dollar value of capital expenditures performed by the affiliate. The High Local Debt 
Dummy is computed by first calculating the ratio of an affiliate's local debt to its assets. An affiliate that 
has a ratio higher than the median in its industry in a particular year is assigned a value of one while an 
affiliate with a ratio below the median is assigned a value of zero. Columns 1, 3, and 5 present OLS 
specifications without fixed effects. Columns 2, 4, and 6 present OLS specifications with parent fixed 
effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Net Income 0.3613*** 0.3523*** 0.3265*** 0.3167*** 0.3195*** 0.3115*** 
(0.0174) (0.0181) (0.0248) (0.0256) (0.0244) (0.0253) 
Lagged Dividend 0.2232*** 0.2113*** 0.2232*** 0.2117*** 0.2212*** 0.2101*** 
Payments (0.0330) (0.0336) (0.0535) (0.0546) (0.0538) (0.0548) 
Capital Expenditures 0.0207** 0.0192** 0.0203 0.0182 
(0.0081) (0.0085) (0.0126) (0.0129) 
High Local Debt 0.0979*** 0.0943*** 0.0975*** 0.0939*** 
Dummy Interacted (0.0354) (0.0358) (0.0351) (0.0355) 
with Net Income 
High Local Debt Dummy 0.0027 0.0014 0.0015 0.0002 
Interacted with Lagged (0.0641) (0.0643) (0.0644) (0.0646) 
Dividend Payments 
High Local Debt Dummy -0.0043 -0.0028 
Interacted with Capital (0.0159) (0.0160) 
Expenditures 
Parent Fixed Effects? No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R-Squared 0.3364 0.3241 0.3392 0.3260 0.3397 0.3263 
No. Obs 101,913 101,913 98,272 98,272 97,805 97,805 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
repatriations by $0.32 for every additional dollar of foreign income. Including capital expenditures 
and their interaction with high local borrowing, in the regressions reported in columns 5 and 6 
has very little effect on these results. The regression reported in column 6 of Table III indicates 
that once affiliate debt levels are taken into account, affiliate capital expenditures have statistically 
insignificant effects on dividend repatriations. In cases of heavily indebted affiliates, affiliate 
capital expenditures have slightly smaller effects on dividend repatriations than they do for other 
affiliates. 
B. Tax Motivations 
Since firms have incentives to organize internal fund transfers in tax-conscious ways, tax 
considerations are likely to influence dividend policies inside firms. The tax consequences of 
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paying dividends are functions of affiliate organizational forms, whether parent companies own 
affiliates directly or indirectly, and local tax rates. The regressions reported in Table IV include 
interactions of net income and lagged dividends with dummy variables for branches and indirectly 
owned incorporated affiliates. These interaction terms identify the extent to which dividend 
payout behavior differs between affiliates with different organizational forms and, consequently, 
differing tax motivations. The regressions also measure the extent to which dividends from 
branch affiliates and indirectly owned affiliates are more or less sensitive to foreign tax rate 
differences than are dividends from directly owned subsidiaries. 
Foreign tax rates are likely to have lesser effects on dividend repatriations from branch affiliates 
and indirectly owned affiliates than they are on dividend repatriations from directly owned 
subsidiaries. Dividend repatriations by foreign branches do not have US tax consequences, since 
the United States taxes foreign branch income independent of whether it is repatriated as 
dividends. Dividend payments from foreign affiliates that American companies own indirectly 
through other foreign affiliates will not trigger a home country tax liability unless the recipient 
resides in a jurisdiction that taxes foreign source income. Since many of the foreign affiliates of 
American corporations that are conduits for indirect ownership are located in countries that do 
not tax foreign income, it is unlikely that dividend payments from affiliates to indirect owners 
generate US tax liabilities.8 
The results reported in column 1 of Table IV suggest that organizational form differences 
have only very minor implications for the general nature of dividend payout processes.9 The 
estimated 0.0425 coefficient on the interaction of the branch dummy variable and affiliate net 
income is positive but small and statistically insignificant. The estimated coefficient on the 
interaction of the branch dummy and lagged dividends is also insignificant. The estimated 
coefficients on variables that interact dummy variables for indirect ownership are likewise 
relatively small and insignificant.'0 Thus the corresponding implied desired payout ratios and 
adjustment parameters for directly owned incorporated affiliates, branches, and indirectly 
owned affiliates are all very close to each other. This regression implies that affiliates with 
different forms of parent ownership and very different tax motivations exhibit similar dividend 
payout policies. 
In Table IV, columns 3 and 5 repeat these regressions, but introduce fixed effects for parent 
firms and a Tobit specification of the regression equation in place of OLS. The results are similar 
to those reported in column 1, in that coefficients on organizational form interactions remain 
insignificant. 
8See Altshuler and Grubert (2003) and Desai, Foley, and Hines (2003). 
9This exercise takes an affiliate's organizational form to be independent of its repatriation policy. Multinational firms 
choose whether to make their affiliates foreign branches or foreign subsidiaries; to the extent that these choices are 
dictated by anticipated future repatriation rates, then a comparison of repatriation rates between affiliates with different 
organizational forms will overstate the impact of tax rate differences. Other characteristics differ between branches 
and subsidiaries that could be correlated with tax rates and repatriation proclivities. Branch affiliates are concentrated 
in certain industries, including petroleum, wholesale trade, and services, though not entirely; in the 1997 sample, 26.4 
% of branch affiliates were in non-petroleum manufacturing, compared with 52.1 % of incorporated affiliates. While 
the geographic distribution of branches and subsidiaries was not identical, the median foreign tax rate paid by branch 
affiliates in 1997 was 30.4 %, compared to 31.1% for incorporated affiliates. Based on this information there is no strong 
reason to suspect that a comparison of the repatriation patterns of branches and subsidiaries would encounter difficulties 
due to spurious correlation with local tax rates. 
'0As defined in these regressions, indirect ownership corresponds to zero direct ownership by the parent company. 
Changing the dummy variable to indicate any nonzero indirect ownership does not change the results. 
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Investigating country-level variation in the tax cost of paying dividends provides a finer 
measure of the importance of tax motivations for affiliates. The regression reported in column 2 
of Table IV includes country tax rates interacted with affiliate net income in addition to the 
variables used in the regressions reported in column 1. Country tax rates are measured by 
calculating ratios of foreign income taxes paid to the sum of foreign income taxes and net income 
for each affiliate observation. Medians of these rates are then used as country-level observations 
for each country and year." For the purposes of calculating country tax rates, affiliates with 
negative net income are excluded. High foreign tax rates reduce the cost of paying dividends 
from directly held foreign subsidiaries to American parent companies, since doing so generates 
accompanying foreign tax credits that offset the associated US tax liability. 
The results reported in column 2 of Table IV confirm that tax costs affect the long-run payout 
ratios of incorporated affiliates. The estimated 0.4085 coefficient on the interaction of country tax 
rates and net income reported in column 2 is both large and statistically significant, indicating 
that affiliates set higher payout ratios in countries where paying dividends generates larger foreign 
tax credits and therefore lower home country tax liabilities.12 Examining the value of the 
interaction of country tax rates and net income across organizational forms provides additional 
evidence of the impact of home country tax considerations on affiliate dividend payments. The 
estimated -0.5058 coefficient on the interaction of country tax rates, net income, and the indirect 
ownership dummy variable implies that tax rates do not influence payout ratios of indirectly 
owned affiliates. The sum of this coefficient and the coefficient on the country tax rate interacted 
with net income is -0.0973, and it does not differ significantly from zero. This result is consistent 
with the tax incentives facing indirectly owned affiliates, and the way in which they differ from 
the incentives of separately incorporated affiliates. The estimated -0.0469 coefficient on the 
interaction of country tax rates, net income, and the branch dummy indicates that tax effects on 
repatriations are also mitigated in the case of foreign branches, which is consistent with their 
incentives. Including parent-firm fixed effects in column 4 and using a Tobit specification in 
column 6 produces similar results.13 In these specifications, the payout ratios of branches and the 
indirectly owned affiliates do not vary with tax rates in a statistically significant way. 
The evidence indicates that incorporated affiliates adjust long-run payout ratios to reflect tax 
costs. The absence of such effects on the payout ratios of branches and indirectly owned affiliates 
is consistent with the importance of tax motivations. Nonetheless, the similarity of the dividend 
policies of affiliates with different organizational forms, and thus different tax treatments, 
indicates that tax motivations do not fully account for patterns of dividend policies inside 
firms.14 
"Affiliates with negative net income are excluded for the purposes of calculating country tax rates. Desai, Foley, and 
Hines (2001) provide a complete description of the properties of country tax rates and alternative methods of their 
calculation. 
'2The US Tax Reform Act of 1986 changed the way in which foreign tax credits were calculated, as a result of which, 
firms faced stronger incentives to adjust their dividend repatriations in response to transitory tax rate changes before 1986 
than they did after 1986. Additional regressions (available from the authors) indicate that repatriations responded more 
sharply to tax differences in the years before 1986 than they did after 1986. 
13Desai, Foley, and Hines (2001) note that tax incentives may vary between affiliates located in the same country. 
Incorporating this variation, along with instrumenting for the affiliate tax rate with a country tax rate, provides an 
additional test of the tax motivations of dividend policy inside the firm - although the results are largely unchanged. 
14Some countries also impose small withholding taxes on repatriations from foreign subsidiaries and foreign branches. 
Using the BEA data to measure the magnitude of these withholding tax rates, and adding withholding taxes as separate 
independent variables, produces results (available from the authors) that indicate that withholding taxes discourage 
repatriations, though the effects of other variables closely resemble those reported in the paper. 
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C. Parent Company Cash Needs 
One straightforward explanation for the presence of Lintner-like patterns inside the firm is 
that the demands of the many and varied shareholders in public capital markets translate into 
demands for dividend repatriations inside the firm. Parent firms that feel obligated to pay 
dividends to common shareholders might draw on financial resources available in foreign 
affiliates, thereby triggering dividend repatriations. In view of the widely documented tendency 
to pay greater dividends out of $1 of foreign earnings than $1 of domestic earnings, this process 
is likely to be strongest in cases of firms with significant foreign earnings."5 Another possibility 
is that parent companies with attractive domestic investment opportunities draw on the 
resources of their foreign affiliates, and these resource flows take the form of dividend 
repatriations. 
Figure 3 illustrates these possibilities. The heights of the bars in the figure measure the fraction 
of domestic parent companies that receive nonzero dividends from their foreign affiliates, 
grouping parent firms into terciles in two different ways. The left-hand bar provided for each 
tercile gives information for firms characterized by the ratio of parent payouts to common 
external shareholders to parent domestic after-tax earnings. The right-hand bar for each tercile 
presents information for firms characterized by the attractiveness of domestic investment 
opportunities, which are measured by Tobin's q, higher values of q corresponding to greater 
desired investment.'6 Figure 3 shows that the parent companies with the highest dividend payout 
ratios are the most likely to receive dividend repatriations from their foreign affiliates. Greater 
investment opportunities are also associated with a higher likelihood of repatriation from foreign 
affiliates, which again suggests that parent companies use repatriations to satisfy their cash 
needs. Since the patterns presented in Figure 3 do not control for affiliate profitability and other 
characteristics that are likely to influence repatriations, to identify more precisely the impact of 
cash demand by parent companies it is necessary to include these characteristics as independent 
variables. 
Comparing the dividend policies of affiliates whose parents have different degrees of exposure 
to public capital markets tests the hypothesis that needs for domestic financial resources to pay 
dividends to common shareholders are strong enough to drive repatriation policies. Table V 
reports the results of affiliate payout regressions that take explicit account of the ownership of 
parents companies, and, in the case of publicly held companies, their dividend policies. The 
dependent variable in the regressions in Table V is dividend repatriations from affiliates to their 
parents. To capture those affiliates that do not face the demands of public shareholders, Column 
1 of Table V is limited to the sample of affiliates whose parents do not appear in Compustat."7 The 
implied desired steady-state payout ratios (0.39) and adjustment parameters (0.80) of affiliates of 
these private firms are similar to the desired payout ratios (0.51) and adjustment parameters 
(0.74) of affiliates whose parents are listed in Compustat, as reported in column 2. Since firms 
'5See Hines (1996), who reports that $1 of foreign profitability has 3-4 times the effect on dividend payments to common 
shareholders than does $1 of domestic profitability. Hines attributes the difference to the use of dividends to signal 
profitability, which may be more difficult for the market to verify in the case of foreign earnings; Bodnar and Weintrop 
(1997) attribute the same phenomenon to the greater growth prospects of foreign earnings. 
16Values of q are measured as the ratio of the book value of assets plus the difference of market and book values of equity 
to the book value of assets. These firm-level q's are categorized into three-digit BEA industry categories, and the median 
firm value of q within an industry is the industry level q. Firm-level regressions (not reported) of domestic investment on 
this measure ofq provide a positive and significant coefficient on q. 
'7While it is possible that such non-Compustat firms are not privately held but are instead foreign-based and therefore not 
listed on an American exchange, manual inspection of the data suggest that this is rarely the case. 
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Figure 3. Repatriation Policies and Parent-Firm Financing Needs 
Figure 3 shows the share of parent firms that receive dividends from affiliates within terciles. The left 
column for each tercile corresponds to a grouping of firms based on the ratio of parent dividends to 
shareholders to parent net income. The right column for each tercile corresponds to a grouping of firms 








tercile Middle tercile Top tercile 
[ Terciles based on parent dividends to external shareholders 
L Terciles based on parent industry q 
that are not publicly traded presumably face little capital market pressure to pay dividends to 
their owners, but nevertheless exhibit similar behavioral patterns, this comparison suggests that 
capital market pressures are unlikely to account for estimated affiliate payout equations. The 
similarity of the dividend policies of the foreign affiliates of private and public parents persists 
when parent-firm fixed effects are included, as reported in columns 4 and 5 of Table V, and in the 
Tobit specifications reported in columns 7 and 8. 
Columns 3, 6, and 9 of Table V report the estimated coefficients from payout equations for 
affiliates of Compustat firms. These columns include a variable intended to capture parental 
financial pressure stemming from financial flows to common shareholders as an independent 
variable. The variable "Parent Dividends to Shareholders Interacted with Relative Assets" is the 
product of parent-firm dividends and the ratio of affiliate assets to total firm assets. If parent firms 
finance dividends to shareholders with funds drawn from all parts of the firm in proportion to assets, 
then an affiliate should be expected to remit a dividend to its parent firm that is equal to the value 
of this variable. Hence, if parent-firm pressures determine repatriation policies in this manner, the 
estimated coefficient on this variable would be close to unity. 
The estimated coefficients on "Parent Dividends to Shareholders Interacted with Relative 
Assets" in the OLS specifications equal roughly 0.14, thus differing significantly from one at the 
5% level. As measured by dividends to common shareholders, parent-firm financial pressures 
explain some, but only a modest portion, of affiliate dividend payouts. In addition, the 
estimates of desired steady-state payout ratios and adjustment parameters are not significantly 
affected by including the "parent dividends" variable on the right-hand side. The OLS results 
reported in columns 3 and 6 of Table V differ somewhat from the Tobit results reported in column 
9, since the estimated coefficients from the Tobit specification suggest that affiliate dividends are 
higher when parent-firm dividends are smaller. Taken together, the results in Table V indicate that 
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the dividend policies of affiliates of privately owned parents are similar to the dividend policies 
of affiliates whose parent firms are publicly owned.18 
Multinational firms that wish to expand domestic investment are able to draw on the resources 
of their foreign affiliates. In turn, these financing needs might dictate repatriation policies, 
particularly if parent firms are otherwise financially constrained. To evaluate this possibility, it is 
useful to examine how repatriation policies vary as a function of domestic investment opportunities 
and limited access to additional external investment funds. Highly leveraged firms have been 
emphasized in previous studies of the role of financing constraints in limiting investment 
responses to profitable opportunities.19 Accordingly, the regressions in Table VI analyze whether 
highly levered parent firms repatriate funds from their foreign affiliates when facing attractive 
domestic investment opportunities, and measure the extent to which such repatriations account 
for the regular patterns of payout policy. 
The dependent variable in the regressions reported in Table VI is total repatriations received by 
parent companies from all of their foreign affiliates. Since these regressions consider the impact 
of financing needs at the parent-company level, the unit of observation is a parent-year cell. 
Column I of Table VI reports a regression that is an aggregated (at the parent-firm level) version 
of the regression reported in column 2 of Table II, with a similar estimated coefficient on net 
income and a somewhat larger coefficient on lagged dividends. The regression reported in column 
2 of Table VI adds an interaction between affiliate income and parent-firm leverage, where 
parent-firm leverage is defined as the ratio of total domestic liabilities to total domestic assets 
reported to the BEA. The estimated coefficients on aggregate affiliate net income and aggregate 
lagged dividends reported in column 2 imply that parent firms with zero leverage have a target 
payout ratio of 50.8%, in contrast to the implied target payout ratio from column 1 of 61.1%. The 
coefficients in column 2 also imply that target payout ratios are a function of leverage, as firms 
with leverage ratios of one have target payout ratios of 70.9%.20 
In evaluating whether financially constrained firms deploy foreign resources to finance domestic 
investment, it is useful to consider the combined impact of leverage and current investment 
opportunities. The regressions in columns 3 and 4 are estimated on separate samples. The 
observations in column 3 consist of firms with domestic activity primarily classified in three-digit 
industry-year cells with above-median values ofTobin's q. The observations in column 4 comprise 
firms with domestic activity primarily classified in industry-year cells with below-median values 
of Tobin's q. The estimated impact of parent leverage differs sharply between these two samples. 
The -0.0236 coefficient in column 3 suggests that greater parent-firm leverage slightly reduces 
the effect of foreign income on repatriations by affiliates of parent companies in industries with 
low q 's, but the 0.1208 coefficient in column 4 implies that greater leverage is associated with 
significantly greater repatriations by firms in industries with high q 's.21 
'8Desai, Foley, and Hines (2002) report similar patterns in their analysis of the impact of ownership transitions, as when 
private firms are taken public and publicly owned firms are taken private in leveraged buyouts. Neither type of ownership 
transition appears to be associated with significant changes in dividend policies. 
'9See, for example, Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1996). 
2The 70.9% target payout ratio is calculated as (0.2729+0.1074)/(1-0.4633). A comparison of leverage ratios from zero 
to one encompasses 95 % of the sample. 
21The q measure of investment opportunities is derived from firm-level data and, as a consequence, captures firm worldwide 
investment opportunities rather than merely domestic investment opportunities. Since the majority of investment and 
business activity by American firms is domestic, it follows that measured q primarily reflects domestic opportunities, but it is 
possible that high values of q could be associated with greater desired foreign investment, which would reduce the incentive 
to repatriate funds from abroad, and reduce the effect of investment opportunities on repatriations as measured in TableVI. 
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Table VI. Lintner Dividend Specifications for Aggregate Affiliate Payments to 
Parent Firms 
The dependent variable in all specifications i  the dollar value of dividend payments by majority-owned 
affiliates aggregated across affiliates in a parent-firm system. Aggregate Net Income is the aggregated after- 
foreign tax net income of affiliates within a parent-firm system. Parent Leverage is the ratio of parent-firm 
domestic current liabilities and long term debt to parent-firm domestic assets. Aggregate Lagged Dividend 
Payments is the aggregated ollar value of dividend payments by affiliates within a parent-firm system in 
the previous year. All of the specifications are OLS specifications with parent-firm fixed effects. The sample 
in the first two columns includes all parent firms in all years. Columns 3 and 4 split the sample into 
subsamples depending on whether a parent firm's industry q is below or above the sample median, 
respectively. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors appear in parentheses. 
Sample Full Sample Low q Sample High q Sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Aggregate Net Income 0.3260*** 0.2729*** 0.4555*** 0.1989*** 
(0.0046) (0.0101) (0.0168) (0.0148) 
Interaction of Aggregate Net 0.1074*** -0.0236 0.1208*** 
Income and Parent Leverage (0.0181) (0.0290) (0.0274) 
Aggregate Lagged Dividend 0.4662*** 0.4633*** 0.1817*** 0.6312*** 
Payments (0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0079) (0.0105) 
Parent Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R- Squared 0.8304 0.8307 0.8891 0.8246 
No. Obs 17,747 17,310 8,355 8,365 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
The evidence in Table VI indicates that the combination of high leverage and significant 
investment opportunities motivates firms to increase target payout ratios for their foreign affiliates. 
Although the regressions reported in Table VI provide evidence that foreign earnings are an 
important source of finance for domestic investment, these results also indicate that the Lintner 
process that characterizes dividend repatriations is not a manifestation of this financing channel 
alone. The coefficients in columns 3 and 4 indicate that firms with no leverage and above-average 
investment opportunities still pursue Lintner-like policies, as do firms with below-average 
investment opportunities regardless of their leverage. Consequently it is necessary to entertain 
additional explanations for the determinants of dividends inside the firm. 
D. Dividends and Incomplete Ownership 
Incomplete ownership of foreign affiliates reduces the ability of parent companies to monitor 
and control foreign managers. Partial ownership of foreign affiliates by local firms in host 
countries increases the risk that a manager will pursue related-party transactions that are not in 
the interest of the multinational parents. In such a setting, a rigid repatriation policy may help to 
control foreign management by limiting its financial discretion. 
This section studies the extent to which multinationals use regular dividend payments to 
mitigate problems arising from incomplete ownership. In order to do so, the regularity of 
dividends is measured by calculating the fraction of years in which dividends are paid by affiliates 
that appear in the sample at least five times. The first three regressions in Table VII report the 
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Table VII. Dividends and Partial Ownership 
The sample in columns 1-3 consists of all affiliates that report dividends five or more times. The dependent 
variable in columns 1-3 is the share of reported ividend payments that are positive. In columns 1-3, Country 
Tax Rate is the median tax rate in the country in which an affiliate is located averaged over all years that 
affiliate appears in the sample. Partial Ownership Dummy takes the value of one if the affiliate is not wholly 
owned in any of the years the affiliate appears in the sample. Log of GDP Per Capita is the log value of GDP 
per capita averaged over all years the affiliate appears in the sample. The sample in columns 4-6 consists of 
those affiliate-years where a parent increases the paid-in-capital of the affiliate. The dependent variable in 
columns 4-6 is a dummy that takes the value one if the affiliate pays a dividend in that year, and zero 
otherwise. In columns 4-6, time-varying measures of the independent variables are used. Heteroskedasticity- 
consistent standard errors appear in parentheses. 
Dummy For Payment of Dividend 
Dependent Percent of Affiliate Dividend by Affiliates when Paid-in Capital 
Variable Payments that are Positive Increases 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 0.2695*** 0.2551*** 0.5385*** -0.7453*** -0.8023*** -0.2011 
(0.0090) (0.0091) (0.0342) (0.0390) (0.0393) (0.1267) 
Country Tax Rate 0.0566** 0.0465* 0.0767*** 0.5093*** 0.4836*** 0.6394*** 
(0.0262) (0.0260) (0.0296) (0.1102) (0.1100) (0.1201) 
Partial Ownership 0.0934*** 0.0851*** 0.4861*** 0.4489*** 
Dummy (0.0083) (0.0084) (0.0352) (0.0365) 
Log of GDP Per -0.0310*** -0.0695*** 
Capita (0.0036) (0.0137) 
No. Obs. 10,513 10,513 10,162 12,090 12,090 11,825 
Log-Likelihood -7,188 -7,094 -6,748 
R-squared 0.0005 0.0148 0.0236 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. 
coefficient estimates using this dependent variable. The positive estimated coefficients on the 
country tax rate variable across the specifications presented in columns 1 through 3 are consistent 
with the tax incentives that affiliates face, since higher foreign tax rates reduce US obligations 
upon repatriation.22 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table VII add a partial ownership dummy that equals one if the American 
parent owns less than 100% of an affiliate, and zero otherwise.23 The results reported in columns 
2 and 3 indicate that partially owned affiliates pay dividends most frequently. The estimated 
coefficients imply that partially owned affiliates pay dividends in 9% more years than do wholly 
owned affiliates. 
One of the strong implications of the US tax treatment of foreign income is that American 
multinational corporations should not simultaneously remit dividends from low-tax foreign 
22In these specifications, tax rates are averaged across all years for which the affiliate is in the sample. As a consequence, 
measurement of relative tax incentives is somewhat noisy. 
23All affiliates in the sample are majorit -wned, so partial ownership is defined as more than 50% but less than 100% 
ownership. 
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Figure 4. Propensity to Pay Dividends, by Changes in Paid-In-Capital (PIC), 1983-2002 
Figure 4 tracks the share of dividend payers for three subsets of majority-owned incorporated affiliates: 
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locations and transfer equity funds into the same foreign locations. Doing so generates a home- 
country tax liability that could be easily avoided simply by reducing both dividends and equity 
transfers. Nevertheless, the data indicate that American multinational firms engage in this tax- 
penalized behavior. 
Figure 4 shows that the likelihood of paying a dividend is the same across the sample period, 
regardless of the contemporaneous change in paid-in-capital. The regressions presented in 
columns 4 through 6 of Table VII show the determinants of tax-penalized behavior, thus testing 
whether this behavior is driven by situations in which parent firms impose rigid repatriation 
policies in reaction to partial ownership of affiliates. 
Columns 4 through 6 of Table VII report the regressions run on the sample of affiliate-years for 
which parent companies increased paid-in affiliate capital. The table reports estimated coefficients 
from Probit specifications in which the dependent variable equals one if the affiliate paid a nonzero 
dividend to its parent and zero otherwise. The large positive estimated coefficients on the country 
tax rate variable indicate that affiliates in high tax rate countries are the most likely to pay dividends 
while receiving equity transfers from their parents, which is consistent with their tax incentives. 
Parent firms without excess foreign tax credits that have affiliates located in countries with high tax 
rates can find it advantageous to remit dividends while simultaneously transferring equity funds 
from the parent, since doing so generates foreign tax credits that can profitably be used to reduce 
tax burdens on other income. The positive coefficients on the partial ownership dummy variable 
support the results reported in columns 2 and 3 indicating that parent companies require partially 
owned affiliates to pay regular dividends. The estimates from column 5 imply that the effect of 
partial ownership is similar to the effect of a 100% higher tax rate. The dividend behavior of partially 
owned affiliates differs significantly from that of affiliates that are wholly owned by their parents. 
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IV. Conclusion 
The foreign affiliates of American multinational corporations follow well-defined 
repatriation policies that entail the gradual adjustment of payouts in the direction of targets 
that depend on current earnings and the tax costs of repatriating dividends. Although 
repatriation policies are responsive to tax factors, the similarity of dividend policies across 
entities that have distinctive tax treatments indicates that tax motivations alone cannot explain 
the patterns of behavior. Repatriations help parent firms meet their financing needs, since 
larger dividends to external shareholders are associated with larger dividend repatriations 
inside the firm. Furthermore, highly levered parent companies with profitable domestic 
investment opportunities draw more heavily on the resources of their foreign affiliates. The 
analysis of explicitly tax-penalized behavior and regularized repatriation policies suggests 
that shared ownership of foreign affiliates contributes substantially to the routinization of 
repatriation policy inside the firm. 
What Black (1976) christened the "dividend puzzle" - the problem of reconciling observed 
dividend behavior with economic incentives facing the relevant decision makers - is typically 
cast as a result of the relationship between external shareholders and intemrnal corporate managers. 
Repatriation policy inside the firm is subject to many, but not all, of the same pressures, as are the 
dividend policies of firms with public ownership. The results in this paper indicate that the factors 
that govern repatriation policies inside the firm - tax factors, costly external finance at the parent 
level, and agency concerns with the firms - are those that scholars emphasize in attempting to 
resolve the dividend puzzle more generally.n 
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